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Abstract. One of deep learning’s attractive benefits is the ability to
automatically extract relevant features for a target problem from largely
raw data, instead of utilizing human engineered and error prone hand-
crafted features. While deep learning has shown success in fields such as
image classification and natural language processing, its application for
feature extraction on raw network packet data for intrusion detection is
largely unexplored. In this paper we modify a Word2Vec approach, used
for text processing, and apply it to packet data for automatic feature
extraction. We call this approach Packet2Vec. For the classification task
of benign versus malicious traffic on a 2009 DARPA network data set, we
obtain an area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) between 0.988-0.996 and an AUC of the Precision/Recall
curve between 0.604-0.667.
1 Introduction
An appealing aspect of many deep learning approaches is the ability to automat-
ically extract features from largely unprocessed data. In Krizhevsky et al. [13],
one of the seminal works that started the popularization of convolutional neu-
ral networks applied to images, they show that the learned early convolutional
kernels displayed a range of image filters, similar to hand-crafted features from
more traditional vision processing approaches such as SIFT [15] and SURF [4].
For text processing, Word2Vec approaches [17, 18] create a vectorized rep-
resentation of words, called embeddings, where similar words (e.g. King and
Queen) are close distance-wise in the embedded space. Vector operations also
make intuitive sense, such as King - Man + Woman = Queen, meaning that
the vector representation of King minus the vector for Man plus the vector for
Woman creates a vector where the closest word embedding is the one for Queen.
This feat is achieved on a large corpus of raw text with little to no-preprocessing.
The deep learning approach is able to create these word embeddings just based
on the text itself without human-engineered feature extraction.
Cyber data and intrusion detection is an area ripe for exploration of how deep
learning can automatically extract features from raw packet data. However, most
of the current work applying deep learning to intrustion detection relies upon
the features already being extracted from packet data [12,27]. Many researchers
choose to use data sets such as NSL-KDD [24,26] or the original 1999 KDD data
set, both of which have 41 features to represent the network packet data.
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Instead of creating hand-crafted features for each packet, the approach we
take is to pass the raw packet data through a Word2Vec approach to create a
vectorized representation for each packet, and then perform classification of the
packet based on that representation.
Specifically, our approach has the following steps:
– N-grams: Word2Vec requires a sequence of tokens. Packet data has no clear
analog. To address this, we take each packet and transform it into a sequence
of n-grams. This forms our sequence of words, similar to the presentation of
text. We purposefully throw out IP and port information, as we want the
representation of the packet to be based on content, not who sent it.
– Embeddings: Once we have a sequence of n-grams, applying Word2Vec is
straightforward, and we create a vectorized representation for each frequent
n-gram (vocab size is a hyperparameter).
– Feature Vectors: To perform classification on each packet, we need a fixed-
size vector representation for each packet. We take the simple approach of
averaging the word embeddings for all of the n-grams in a packet, i.e.
v(p) =
∑
t∈p e(t)
|p| (1)
where p is a packet, t ∈ p are the n-grams of p, |p| is the number of n-grams
found in p, and e(t) returns the embedding for n-gram t.
– Learning and Classification: Once we have each packet translated into
fixed-size feature vectors, we then pass those feature vectors to a supervised
machine learning approach for training and then testing on unseen data.
Intrusion detection is an important area of research, vital for protection of
national infrastructures, intellectual property, financial systems, privacy, and
safety; however, the problem is a moving target, an arms race between defend-
ers and attackers, along with constant evolution of the underlying technologies.
There is evidence of growing sophistication among malicious actors. Symantec
reports that the number of targetted attack groups, i.e. groups that are pro-
fessional, highly organized, and target specifically rather than indiscriminately,
grew at a rate of 29 groups a year between the years of 2015 to 2017, from a
total of 87 to 140 [25]. Also, as evidence of constant change in the cyber arena,
the number of IoT (Internet of Things) attacks grew by 600%, an increase of
54% of mobile malware variants, and an 80% increase in Mac malware.
We view our contribution as a way to increase the rate that defenders can
evolve their methods to protect networks and infrastructure. Instead of manually
hand-crafting features, which is error prone and difficult to determine impact,
we can rely upon our Packet2Vec approach to automatically calculate features
of interest.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our ap-
proach in detail, including the steps we took to parallelize our solution. Section
3 presents the results of using our approach on a large cyber data set. Section 4
covers related work. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Approach
In the introduction, we presented our approach at a high-level. However, apply-
ing Word2Vec on cyber data is challenging due to amount of information. In
particular, we examined the DARPA 2009 data set [10]. This data set spans a
period of 10 days, from November 3rd to November 12th, 2009. It is broken up
into files that are just over 1 billion bytes (954 MBs), where each file represents
1-6 minutes worth of traffic. In this work we examined the first day, which is
roughly 15.5 hours (it starts after 8:30 am) and comprises 558.8 GBs in total
packet data. Due to the size of the data, we needed to create an iterative process
for training our model.
Our solution is a combination of C++ code that is then exposed to python
using Boost python [2]. We developed most of our implementation in C++ for
performance, but then exposed it to python so that we could integrate with
the Tensorflow library [1] for creating the embeddings for the n-grams, and the
Scikit-learn library [6] for the classifier models to make predictions on whether
the packets are benign or malicious. We also took efforts to parallelize the code
using standard C++ features such as std::thread to manually instrument the
code. As we discuss the implementation, we will highlight the parallelization.
Also, in Section 3.1, we will discuss the parallel performance of the code.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the iterative approach. The first phase (pseu-
docode found in Algorithm 1), creates a dictionary, mapping n-grams to integer
identifiers. The first phase begins by iterating through all pcap files used for
training, n-gramming each packet, and incrementing the counter for each n-gram.
After obtaining counts for each n-gram found in all the training files, identifiers
are assigned for the top |V | n-grams, where |V | is the size of the vocabulary, a
hyperparameter. Concerning memory utilization, we only load one pcap file at a
time. Also, the dictionary is limited by the number of found n-grams. We used
2 byte n-grams, which at most has 216 possible values.
The actual implementation of Algorithm 1 is a bit more nuanced as we struc-
tured it in such a way to enable parallelization. We first iterate in parallel over
all packets and n-gram them. This is embarrassingly parallel and requires no
inter-thread coordination. The end result is a vector of vector of n-grams. Then
we flatten the vector of vector of n-grams into a single vector of n-grams, again in
parallel. Finally, we hand the single vector of all n-grams to the dictionary, which
updates the frequency counts for each n-gram. This is the only loop that requires
coordination between threads, as two threads can potentially try to update the
count for the same n-gram; however, adding mutexes around the update routine
makes it thread safe. After all files have been processed, we also parallelize the
implementation of lines 15 - 18. We need the dictionary for later phases, so we
write it out to disk on line 19.
The second phase (Algorithm 2) utilizes the dictionary created from the first
phase to translate the pcap files into integers. We iterate through each pcap file
(line 1), creating two data structures for each pcap file. One data structure is
a list of integers (line 2), which is the pcap file translated into integers using
the dictionary. There is also a vector of vector of integers (line 3), which is the
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Fig. 1: Implementation of iterative pcap processing approach. The first phase
creates a dictionary, mapping n-grams to integer identifiers. The dictionary is
utilized in the second phase to transform the raw pcap data into integer vectors
which are saved on disk. In the third phase, a Word2Vec approach is applied to
the 1D integer vectors to create the n-gram embeddings. These embeddings are
used in conjunction with the 2D integer vectors to create feature vectors (fourth
phase) which are then used for training in the final phase.
Algorithm 1 Training Phase 1: Creating the Dictionary
1: T , the set of pcap files used for training.
2: D, a dictionary mapping from n-grams to integers.
3: |V |, the size of the vocabulary.
4: for all f ∈ T do
5: for all packet ∈ f do
6: ngrams← ngram(packet)
7: for all ngram ∈ ngrams do
8: D[ngram]← D[ngram] + 1
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: keys← sort(D) . Keys sorted by decreasing frequency
13: D.clear() . Clear out counts
14: i← 1
15: while i ≤ |V | do
16: D[key[i]]← i
17: i← i + 1
18: end while
19: write(D)
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same as the integer list, but now indexed by packet. After processing a pcap file,
we write out the list of integers (line 13) and the vector of vector of integers to
disk (line 14). This again allows us to process all of the large pcap files without
exceeding memory limits. We also parallelize the for loop of line 1. Each of the
packets can be handled independently, so it is embarrasingly parallel.
The third phase is where we create the word embeddings, i.e. vectorized
representations for each n-gram in the vocabulary. The process is described in
Algorithm 3 in high level pseudocode. We iterate over all the integer files (pcap
files translated by the dictionary into a single sequence of integers). On the first
iteration we create an embedding model based on the first integer file using a
standard word2vec approach. This creates a matrix of size |V |×embedding size,
where each row corresponds to the learned vector representation of an n-gram.
This first embedding matrix serves as the starting point for the next iteration of
applying word2vec to another integer file. We continue in this manner until all
integer files have been processed.
Algorithm 2 Training Phase 2:
Translating Pcap Files
1: for all f ∈ T do
2: l, a list of integers
3: vv, a 2D vector of integers
4: for all packet ∈ f do
5: v, a vector of integers
6: ngrams← ngram(packet)
7: for all ng ∈ ngrams do
8: l.push back(D[ng])
9: v.push back(D[ng])
10: end for
11: vv.push back(v)
12: end for
13: write(l)
14: write(vv)
15: end for
Algorithm 3 Training Phase 3:
Creating Word Embeddings
1: L, the set of files with lists of inte-
gers
2: first run← True
3: for all l ∈ L do
4: if first run then
5: E ← create model(l)
6: first run = False
7: else
8: E ← update model(l, E)
9: end if
10: end for
11: write(E)
The method for training the model is a standard word2vec approach. We
use the skip-gram model [18] with noise constrastive estimation [11]. The basis
of this approach is for the network to predict the context given a target word.
However, with noise constrastive estimation, it becomes a logistic regression
problem where the network is making a binary classification for each word in
the vocabulary of whether or not it came the distribution of context words or
from the noise distribution (unrelated words). The hyperparameters associated
with this approach include the following. In paranthesis we specify the value we
used in our experiments. Batch size (128): The number of words considered at
one time. Skip window (1): How big of a context window to consider. A value of
one selects words to the left and right of the target word. Num skips (2): The
batch size is divided by num skips to determine the number of skip windows.
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Embedding size (128): The size of each embedding vector. Num negative (64):
The number of negative examples used per batch. Num steps (100000): How
many batches to create and from which to train.
The fourth phase utilizes the word embeddings in conjunction with the two
dimensional integer vectors to create the feature files. Each feature file is a matrix
where each row represents the features derived for a packet. On line 3 we iterate
over the two dimensional integer vector files, V V . On line 6 we iterate over each
vector, v, within the two dimensional integer vector, vv. v is a vector of integers,
representing the n-grams of the original packet translated using D, the dictionary
from Algorithm 1. To create a single representation for the entire packet, we use
the simple strategy of averaging the embeddings (lines 9 - 12). In the end, we
write out each feature matrix, X, to disk (line 15).
There is also another process for producing labels for the data. The DARPA-
2009 dataset has a spreadsheet with labels; however, the labeling is not at the
individual packet level. It lists times, IP addresses, and ports used by malicious
traffic. Thus, to create labels, we read in the original pcap files and evaluate each
packet, checking if the parameters of the packet match those of an entry in the
label spreadsheet.
Algorithm 4 Training Phase 4:
Create Feature Vectors
1: V V , set of files with 2D vector of
integers
2: E, the word embeddings indexed
by integer identifier
3: for i← 1 to |V V | do
4: vv ← V V [i]
5: X, a matrix of features
6: for j ← 1 to |vv| do
7: v ← vv[j]
8: x, a vector of features
9: for all integer ∈ v do
10: x← x + E[integer]
11: end for
12: x← x/|v|
13: X[j]← x
14: end for
15: write(X)
16: end for
Algorithm 5 Training Phase 5:
Train Classifier
1: Xfiles, the list of feature files.
2: yfiles, the list of label files.
3: nest, the number estimators per
file.
4: rfc ← RFC(warm start =
True, nest)
5: i← 0
6: for i← 1 to |Xfiles| do
7: X ← Xfiles[i]
8: if X has positive then
9: if i 6= 0 then
10: rfc.nest += nest
11: end if
12: y ← yfiles[i]
13: rfc.fit(X, y)
14: end if
15: end for
16: write(rfc)
The last phase of training is to train an actual classifier. After phase 4, we
finally have the data in a format that can be ingested by a standard machine
learning algorithm. We have a set of files that contain the feature vectors for
each packet, and we have another corresponding set of files that have a binary
label indicating a benign/malicious packet. Algorithm 5 outlines the iterative
approach to learning. In particular we show pseudocode related to the Random
Forest Classifier [5], but it can be easily generalized to other machine learning
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algorithms. An important point to note here is the warm start parameter on line
4. Since we are training in batches over many files, we need to maintain what
was learned from earlier files. The warm start parameter of Scikit-learn [6] is
used when multiple calls to the fit function are used. In the case of the Random
Forest Classifier, a number of estimators (trees) are created per file. However,
this doesn’t work if a file does not contain any malicious examples. On line 8
we skip any files that do not have malicious packets. What warm start means
differs depending on the classifier used. For example, with neural networks we
would initialize the model with the weights learned from training on previous
files.
3 Results
In this section we discuss two aspects of performance: 1) the throughput achieved
when applying a trained classifier, and 2) the classifier performance in detect-
ing malicious network activity. The system we used for our experiments was a
DGX [22], a supercomputer designed for accelerating deep learning applications
with powerful GPUs. However, except for the Packet2Vec portion that creates
embeddings, our code primarily uses the CPU. The CPU is a dual Intel Xeon
20-core E5-2698 v4 2.2 GHz processor with 512 GBs 2133 MHz DDR4 memory.
There is some variability to the timing of runs as other users are also using the
system concurrently.
We tested our implmentation on the DARPA-2009 data set [10]. DARPA-
2009 is a generated data set covering a period of time from November 3-10, 2009.
Traffic is simulated between a /16 local subnet that goes through a cisco router
to the Internet. There are a variety of protocols (e.g. HTTP, SMTP, DNS) and
malicious activities (e.g. DDoS, Phishing, port scans, spam bots). For this work,
we treat all the malicious categories as single class so the problem is binary
classification: malicious or benign. We evaluated our approach on the first day’s
worth of data (about 15.5 hours because the data starts around 8:30 am). In
total for the first day there are 600 pcap files, each 1 billion bytes (954 MBs).
Groundtruth labels are provided in the form a spreadsheet specifying the IPs,
ports, and a bounding time window of when an attack occurred. For the portion
we used, malicious activity accounted for 0.46% of the the total packets.
3.1 Processing Time
In this section we report on the processing time for applying a trained classifier
on unseen data. It is important that our approach be able to keep pace with
data creation. While application of a trained machine learning model is generally
not a concern - testing is often orders of magnitude faster than training - our
approach does have significant preprocessing steps. To classify unseen data, we
need the following as input: 1) a pcap file, 2) the dictionary from n-grams to
integers (created during Algorithm 1 and written to disk on line 19), 3) the
n-gram embeddings (created from Algorithm 3 and written to disk on line 11),
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and 4) the trained classifier (created during Algorithm 5 and written to disk on
line 16).
The overall process of applying a trained classifier to unseen data is described
below. We will make note of which portions are serial, serial but could be paral-
lelized, and already parallelized.
1. Read pcap object: We read in a pcap object. Unless there is parallel I/O,
this is largely a serial operation and cannot be parallelized.
2. N-gram the packets: For each of the packets in the pcap object, we n-gram
them. This step has been parallelized.
3. Translate the n-grams into integers: Using the dictionary, we translate each
vector of n-grams into a vector of integers. This step has been parallelized.
4. Create the feature matrix: This step takes the translated packet data of in-
tegers and converts them into embedding vectors, averages the embeddings,
and then fills a matrix that has all the feature vectors. This step should be
parallelizable but since we use a python object within C++ as the feature
matrix, we run into issues with the Python global interpreter lock only allow-
ing one thread. This should be surmountable, but will require a deeper dive
into Boost python [2] and the NumPy C-API, which is C-based API for ma-
nipulating NumPy data structures (the feature matrix is a NumPy.ndarray).
5. C++ to python overhead: The function to create the feature matrix is writ-
ten in C++ but we added a python interface. The python function reports
on average 13.6 seconds more than the corresponding C++ implementation.
We hypothesize this may be due to memory transfer costs. Regardless, this
will be difficult to optimize without a deep exploration into Boost python.
6. Making predictions on the feature matrix: Here we apply the trained classifier
to the now prepared feature matrix. We use the Scikit-learn library [6] for
the machine learning models. This step could also be parallelized using one
of the python libraries for parallel execution, but we have not taken that
step yet.
To evaluate the parallel performance of the pipeline to apply a trained clas-
sifier to unseen data, we trained a Random Forest Classifier [5] on one pcap
file and then tested it on another pcap, varying the number of threads. Figure 2
gives the overall time while Figure 3 provides the relative speedup as we increase
the thread count. As expected, the parallel portion’s total time decreases as we
increase the number of threads, though the overall speedup plateaus around 10
threads.
Since we have good understanding of which portions of the program are
parallel and which are serial, using Amdahl’s law we can estimate the maximum
achievable speedup: Speedup(t) = 1(1−p)+ pt , where we can think of t as the
number of cores applied to the program and p is the proportion of the code
that benefits from parallel execution. As t → ∞, the equation becomes just
Speedup(t) = 11−p . Table 1 shows the maximum theoretical speedup based upon
the times from using one thread. The Current row shows the times for the parallel
and serial portions for our current implementation. Based on those numbers,
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Fig. 2: Time for Testing One File: We
apply a trained Random Forest Clas-
sifier to unseen data and report the
times. The portion of the code that
has been parallelized shows improve-
ment up to ten threads.
Fig. 3: Relative Speedup: Same data
as Figure 2 but now showing relative
speedup of the overall testing phase
and the parallel portion.
our maximum speedup is about 2.9. Experimentally, we achieved a 2.3 speedup
with ten threads. If we parallelized steps four and six, which certainly seems
possible, then the maximum speedup is close to 9.2. Of course this is only single
node speedup, and we can obtain greater aggregate throughput on a distributed
system. If pcap data is ingested on multiple nodes, the task of classifying network
traffic is embarrassingly parallel once the dictionary, embeddings, and trained
classifier have been distributed.
Table 1: Theoretical Speedup
Parallel Serial Max
Portion Portion Speedup
Current 106.4 56.5 2.9
Future 145.2 17.7 9.2
Table 2: Testing Throughput
Num Time Size Rate
Files (hours) (GBs) (MB/s)
Data creation 600 15.5 559 10.3
RFC 10 600 14.5 559 11.0
RFC 820 300 25.5 279 3.1
Naive Bayes 300 7.6 279 10.5
We also did some longer runs of applying a classifier to large sets of pcaps
to gauge average throughput. Table 2 summarizes the results. For the simpler
models, we can classify at about 10.5-11 MB/s while packet data is created at
an average rate of 10.3 MB/s. The original data (the first day of DARPA-2009)
comprises 15.5 hours and 600 files. We ran the Random Forest Classifier trained
on one pcap on the entire data set. We also ran another Random Forest Classifier
that was trained on 300 files and tested it on the other 300 files. Similarly, we
trained a Naive Bayes classifier on 300 files and tested on the other half. For all
the runs we utilized ten threads.
The difference between the two Random Forest Classifiers is that the one
trained on one pcap file has ten estimators while the one trained on 300 files has
820 estimators. The difference comes from the fact that in order to incorporate
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knowledge from other files to an existing Random Forest Classifier, we had to
increase the number of estimators, essentially creating additional trees for each
file. Thus, the Random Forest with 820 estimators has a much lower throughput
because the longer predictions times (about 6 seconds versus 214 seconds). In
the future, we plan to parallelize the prediction for loop which will likely make
the difference in throughput less drastic. The Random Forest Classifier with ten
estimators and the Naive Bayes were able to keep pace with the data creation
rate.
3.2 Classifier Performance
We tested out two classifiers, the Random Forest Classifier [5] and Gaussian
Naive Bayes [7]. We split the first day of DARPA-2009 into two sets of 300 files,
one for training and one for testing. We listed all 600 files and gave training
the even files and testing the odd files. This gave both sets representative data
throughout the day.
We report two metrics, the area under the curve (AUC) for both the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the Precision/Recall curve. The ROC
curve plots true positive rate against the false positive rate as the threshold is
varied. A perfect score for the AUC is 1.0. The ROC is known to provide overly
optimistic results when data skew is present, as is with DARPA-2009.
The Precision/Recall curve emphasizes how good the predictions are for the
minority class (i.e. malicious traffic). Precision is defined as the true positives
divided by the true positives and false positives. So it is the fraction of results
that are correct returned by the model: Precision = TPTP+FP . Recall is defined as
the number of true positives divided by the true positives plus the false negatives:
Recall = TPTP+FN . This gives you the fraction of the entire target class that are
being returned by the model.
Table 3 gives an overview of both classifiers and both metrics. The AUC ROC
metric gives a somewhat optimistic impression of the classifier’s skill, with values
between 0.988 and 0.996, while the AUC or the precision/recall curve range
between 0.604 and 0.667. The AUC of the precision/recall curve is probably
more useful as it gives an idea of how good the classifier does at predicting the
minority class. Figures 4 and 5 present the ROC and precision/recall curves for
the Random Forest Classifier, respectively, while Figure 6 and 7 are for Gaussian
Naive Bayes.
Table 3: Classifier performance
AUC ROC AUC Precision/Recall
Random Forest Classifier 0.996 0.604
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.988 0.667
In both cases, there is a signficant change in the precision/recall curve when
recall is about 0.94. For Gaussian Naive Bayes, the plot is a little deceptive as
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Fig. 4: Random Forest Classifier - Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic
Fig. 5: Random Forest Classifier - Preci-
sion/Recall
Fig. 6: Gaussian Naive Bayes - Receiver
Operating Characteristic
Fig. 7: Gaussian Naive Bayes - Preci-
sion/Recall
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the first point from the data is (0.937, 0.417) with a threshold of 1, meaning
that any prediction less than one was considered benign. The point at (0, 1) is
by definition. We believe there is a large class of malicious behavior, likely the
DDoS traffic, that both classifiers have a relatively easy time predicting. The
transition at recall = 0.94 is likely for the other classes of malicious behavior.
Tables 4 and 5 provide some points along the precious/recall curve for the
two classifiers, along with the corresponding F1 score. This is to give an idea of
the tradeoff between finding malicious behavior and dealing with false positives.
For instance, the first row of Table 4 shows that the Random Forest Classifier
can find 98.8% of the malicious traffic, but you have to deal with about 94% of
the returned results being false positives. If that is too many, one could use the
threshold of the third line, where about half of the returned results are actually
malicious and you still catch 95% of the total malicious behavior.
Table 4: Random Forest Classifier -
Precision Recall
Precision Recall Threshold F1
0.060 0.988 0.006 0.113
0.108 0.981 0.009 0.195
0.504 0.951 0.029 0.659
0.630 0.930 0.285 0.751
Table 5: Gaussian Naive Bayes - Pre-
cision Recall
Precision Recall Threshold F1
0.050 0.963 2.0e-134 0.095
0.010 0.947 1.31e-118 0.181
0.417 0.937 0.999 0.577
4 Related Work
A work similar to our own is that of Lotfollahi et al. [14] and their approach
called Deep Packet. They focus on two problems, traffic characterization (e.g.
identifying peer-to-peer traffic) and application identification (e.g. identifying
traffic eminating from Skype or Tor), and use raw packet data as their data
source. Like our approach, they avoid hand crafted features, but instead of a
Word2Vec-based approach, they directly feed the packet bytes into a deep learn-
ing architecture. Packets are truncated or padded to be 1500 bytes long, and then
fed into either a 1D convolutional neural network or a stacked autoencoder.
There are several papers that use deep learning, but they apply the network to
already derived features. For the most part they test out deep learning strategies
on either KDD or NSL-KDD [24, 26]. KDD is a challenge dataset from 1999
with artificially generated network data. The data was composed of benign and
malicious connections, with each connection comprising 41 features. NSL-KDD
is a modification of the original KDD data set to remove redundant records.
Javaid et al. [12] use Self-taught Learning [23] on NSL-KDD. Self-taught
learning is an approach where you first use an unsupervised machine learning
technique to create another representation of the data. For example, Javaid
et al. use an autoencoder to translate the NSL-KDD feature set into a smaller
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representation. This new representation is then used as the basis for classification
in a supervised training algorithm. Yin et al. [27] also employ deep learning, this
time with recurrent neural networks, but they also test their approach on NSL-
KDD. We agree with the conclusions of Malowidzki et al. [16], that many of the
labeled public datasets are outdated, including NSL-KDD.
In terms of work that has examined the same data set, Moustafa and Slay [19]
ran tcptrace on the first 30 files of DARPA-2009 to create flow-based features
from which they filter down to 11 features in total. It is somewhat difficult to
compare their work with ours as they are doing classification at the flow level,
rather than at the packet level as we do. Also, they only examine 30 files, of which
they report that 99.995% of the malicious activity is related to DDoS, while our
600 files covers a much broader range of categories of malicious activity. Also,
they report that malicious flows account for 45.5% of their data set. It may be a
difference between flows and packets, but we found malicious packets to account
for far less: 0.46%. Their best recorded model was a decision tree, that missed
10 positive examples (there were 12 total non DDoS flows) and had no false
positives.
Ackerman et al. [3] also examines DARPA-2009. They divide up the data
into temporal chunks of one minute each, resulting in 13,835 chunks over the
ten days, with 1,848 being malicious (if any malicious activity occured during
the time period) and 11,987 benign. They then selected 25 features that were
aggregate computations over the time intervals. They used diffusion maps [8]
for dimensionality reduction. Then from a single initial point in the new feature
space, they expand to find all similar points by recursively adding ones that are
within a certain distance of an existing point. They do not report precision/recall
numbers, but from what they do state we calculated an average precision of 0.03
and and average recall of 0.08, both of which are considerably lower than our
results. However, they obtain their results from a single example. for finding
other instances of malicious behavior in unlabeled data.
Part of the allure of deep learning is the ability to extract relevant features.
Other work that focuses on feature extraction include Ngyuen et al. [21], where
they use sketches [20] to approximate values in the stream of network data and
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA’s) to increase throughput, achieving a
rate of 21.25 Gbps. Das et al. [9] also use an FPGA-based approach and a Feature
Extraction Module (FEM) based on sketches.
5 Conclusions
We have a presented a novel application of Word2Vec, called Packet2Vec, that
translates packets into vectorized representations. We have demonstrated promis-
ing results, with classifiers achieving an AUC of the ROC between 0.988-0.996
and an AUC of the Precision/Recall curve between 0.604-0.667. The method
can be used on raw packet data and does not require any domain expertise to
extract relevant features.
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There are many possible avenues for future work: Temporal phenomenon:
We completely ignored temporal information. Many detection strategies utilize
temporal information to distinguish between human actors and bots. How to
incorporate temporal information within a deep learning strategy for cyber data
is unexplored to our knowledge. Aggregating predictions: We made classifi-
cation at the packet level. However, to a human analyst, it is likely more useful
to roll up predictions to the level of a flow, or an IP, or a domain. Existing fea-
tures: While we rely upon the deep learning model to extract relevant features,
augmenting with existing approaches could be a fecund avenue to explore.
We believe that deep learning has much to offer cyber analysis, and that
this work is just an intial step into discovering solutions for pressing security
problems.
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